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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS

GLENN

CONNERS &

JAMES EDWARD MARTIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,

Case Nos.
12866&
12894

Defendant-Respondent. ,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants, Thomas Glenn Conners & James
Edward Martin, appeal from a denial of a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District
Comt, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellants pleaded guilty to charges of Grand
Larceny on May 7, 1971, and were thereafter committed
to the Utah State Prison for the term prescribed by law.
On December 10, 1971, appellants petitioned for a writ
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of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The petition was de'.
nied on March 28, 1972.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the order of the
lower comt denying the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants, Thomas Glenn Conners & James Edward
Martin came to Salt Lake City in an automobile that
was registered and licensed in the State of Texas. While
appellants were applying for a license and title change ,
at the Department of Motor Vehicles, it was discovered
that the automobile had been reported stolen in the Stat€
of Texas.
On March 4, 1971, a complaint was filed charging
appellants with the crime of Grand Larceny. Appellants
were arrested the same day pursuant to a warrant of
arrest. Subsequently, the appellants pleaded guilty to the
crime charged in case numbers 23285 and 23302 in the
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, the
Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding. The pleas were
accepted and on March 4, 1971, the appellants were com·
mitted to the Utah State Prison.
On December 10, 1971, the appellants petitioned the
same court for a writ of habeas corpus, which petition
was denied March 28, 1972 following a hearing. It is of
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the denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus that
appellants seek review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT HAD JURISDICTION
OF THE CRIME OF' GRAND LARCENY TO
WHICH APPELLANTS PLEADED GUILTY.
The information filed against appellants charged
them of the crime of grand larceny in violation of § 7638-1 and § 76-38-4 (U. C. A., 1953), to wit:
"That on or about the 28th day of February, 1971,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said
James Edward Martin aka Raymond Gordon
Bryant and Thomas Glenn Conners stole personal
property having a value in excess of $50.00, lawful money of the United States, from Charles
Robelia."
The crime of grand larceny is defined in § 76-38-1
as follows:
"Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying
or driving away the personal property of another.
Possession of property recently stolen, when the
person in possession fails to make a satisfactory
explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
of guilt."
The degree of larceny to which appellants pleaded
guilty is covered by the portions of § 76-38-4 set forth
below:
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"Grand larceny is committed in either of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of value exceeding $50.... "
Utah comts sitting in counties into which property
stolen in other states has been brought have the appropriate jurisdiction conferred upon them under § 77-8-16
(U. C. A., 1953), which provides:
"The jurisdiction of a criminal action for stealing
in any territory or other state the property of another, or receiving it knowing it to have been
stolen, and bringing the same into this state, is
in any county into or through which such stolen
property has been brought."
Appellants pleaded guilty to stealing a 1969 Oldsmobile which had a value in excess of $50.00 (T. 4). Thus,
appellants' theft satisfies the requirements of the aforementioned statutes, and constitutes an actionable wrong
which was properly redressed in the lower court pursuant
to the jurisdiction conferred upon it by § 77-8-16.
Appellants claim, however, that a conviction under
§ 76-38-4 cannot lie since the automobile was stolen in
Texas and not in Salt Lake County, Utah. However,
§ 76-38-13 (U. C. A., 1953) is very explicit regarding the
stealing of property in another state and bringing it inro
the State of Utah.
"Every person who in another state or country,
steals the property of another, or receives such
property knowing it to have been stolen,. and
brings the same into this state, may be convicted
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and punished in the same manner as if such larceny or receiving had been committed in this
state."
This section clearly makes it a crime to bring stolen
property into the State of Utah, and represents the majority view regarding this problem in the United States.
156 American Law Review 862,866. Hence, appellants'
contention in Point III of its brief that Utah has no "interest" and therefore no constitutional right to punish
crimes committed in another jurisdiction is based upon
an e1roneous premise. § 76-38-13 does not undertake to
punish for an offense committed in Texas, but for bringing i11to Utah property stolen without its limits with a
view of protecting the citizens of the State of Utah from
purchasing stolen property which might later be recovered
by the rightful owner. Such a statute has consistently
withstood a variety of constitutional objections. 156
A. L. R., supra, at 886-889.

Appellants further claim that the action was improperly brought under § 76-38-4. However, § 76-38-13
states that any person bringing stolen goods into the
state may be convicted "in the same manner as if such
larceny . . . had been committed in this state." Thus,
76-38-4 would be the proper section under which appellants' action should be brought. Had the legislature
intended that such actions be brought under § 76-38-13,
it would have otherwise indicated.
Appellants also argue that the so-called "extraterritorial" effect of § 76-38-13 might result in one being
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punished for a felony in Utah when the state in which the
offense originally occurred could only punish for a mis.
demeanor. In the instant case, however, had appellants
been convicted of larceny in Texas, they would have been
required to serve in the state prison for a minimum of
two years as opposed to the one year minimum in Utah.
Vernal's Texas Penal Code, §§ 1410, 1421 (Vol. 3, 1953)
cf. § 78-38-6 (U. C. A., 1953). Thus, the very statute
against which appellants argue theoretically confers a
benefit upon them.
Even assuming arguendo, there had been a minor
defect in the information, any defect was waived when
appellants failed to object to the information prior to the
pleading thereto. State v. Warwick, 11 Utah 2d 116, 355
P. 2d 703 (1960), involved an alleged misuse of the defendant's confession in a murder case. The court said:
"Since the defendant pleaded to the information
in the district court without first objecting to the
information, he is conclusively presumed to have
waived any defect." Id. at 705.
There can be no doubt that appellants were guilty
of the crime of grand larceny, and that the info1TI1ation
to which they pleaded was proper.
POINT II.
BY PLEADING GUILTY TO THE CRIME
OF GRAND LARCENY, APPELLANTS
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO COMPULSORY
PROCESS OF WITNESSES.
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Before accepting the guilty pleas entered in the lower
court, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft carefully apprised
appellants of their constitutional rights. The applicable
portions of the trial transcript are set forth below:
"In this court you have various constitutional
rights under our state constitution, as well as the
federal constitution. One of them is a right t.o a
trial by jury. Any defendant charged with the
crime in this case is entitled to come into court,
pick a jury of eight people and require the State
to present its evidence to the jury and convinre
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt. You
are entitled to such a jury trial.
"In case of a jury trial, you have a right to
be confronted by witnesses against you. That
means that you have a right to come into court,
require the State to call its witnesses; put them
under oath and on the witness stand, and give
your attorney the right at cross examination.
"And in trying the case to the jury, the State
must satisfy all eight jurors of guilt. It must be
a unanimous decision. And in connection with
the jury trial, you are each entitled if you have
any witnesses, to call to have them subpoened in
by the court at State expense.
"[And] by pleading guilty, each of you waives
the various constitutional rights that I have mentioned to you" (T. 4).
A more thorough explanation of the right to compulsory process cannot be conceived. Additional explanations by the judge manifests beyond doubt that the
appellants waived the right to compulsory process of
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witnesses, along with other constitutional rights, by an
intelligent, knowing, and voluntary plea of guilty (T. 5-9),
The record on its face compels the conclusion that
appellants' argument regarding compulsory process is ;
irrelevant. The Supreme Court of Utah is not a forum
for abstract legal debates.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, respondent moves that
the order of the court below denying appellants' petition
for a writ of habeas corpus be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for

